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Schinzel, Sebastian

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  • Schinzel, Sebastian (39)
  • Poddebniak, Damian (10)
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Content-Type: multipart/oracle -- Tapping into Format Oracles in Email End-to-End Encryption (2023)
Ising, Fabian ; Poddebniak, Damian ; Kappert, Tobias ; Saatjohann, Christoph ; Schinzel, Sebastian
S/MIME and OpenPGP use cryptographic constructions repeatedly shown to be vulnerable to format oracle attacks in protocols like TLS, SSH, or IKE. However, format oracle attacks in the End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) email setting are considered impractical as victims would need to open many attacker-modified emails and communicate the decryption result to the attacker. But is this really the case? In this paper, we survey how an attacker may remotely learn the decryption state in email E2EE. We analyze the interplay of MIME and IMAP and describe side-channels emerging from network patterns that leak the decryption status in Mail User Agents (MUAs). Concretely, we introduce specific MIME trees that produce decryption-dependent net work patterns when opened in a victim’s email client. We survey 19 OpenPGP- and S/MIME-enabled email clients and four cryptographic libraries and uncover a side-channel leaking the decryption status of S/MIME messages in one client. Further, we discuss why the exploitation in the other clients is impractical and show that it is due to missing feature support and implementation quirks. These unintended defenses create an unfortunate conflict between usability and security. We present more rigid countermeasures for MUA developers and the standards to prevent exploitation.
"I don’t know why I check this...'' - Investigating Expert Users' Strategies to Detect Email Signature Spoofing Attacks (2022)
Mayer, Peter ; Poddebniak, Damian ; Fischer, Konstantin ; Brinkmann, Marcus ; Somorovsky, Juraj ; Schinzel, Sebastian ; Volkamer, Melanie
OpenPGP is one of the two major standards for end-to-end email security. Several studies showed that serious usability issues exist with tools implementing this standard. However, a widespread assumption is that expert users can handle these tools and detect signature spoofing attacks. We present a user study investigating expert users' strategies to detect signature spoofing attacks in Thunderbird. We observed 25 expert users while they classified eight emails as either having a legitimate signature or not. Studying expert users explicitly gives us an upper bound of attack detection rates of all users dealing with PGP signatures. 52% of participants fell for at least one out of four signature spoofing attacks. Overall, participants did not have an established strategy for evaluating email signature legitimacy. We observed our participants apply 23 different types of checks when inspecting signed emails, but only 8 of these checks tended to be useful in identifying the spoofed or invalid signatures. In performing their checks, participants were frequently startled, confused, or annoyed with the user interface, which they found supported them little. All these results paint a clear picture: Even expert users struggle to verify email signatures, usability issues in email security are not limited to novice users, and developers may need proper guidance on implementing email signature GUIs correctly.
Sicherheit medizintechnischer Protokolle im Krankenhaus (2022)
Saatjohann, Christoph ; Ising, Fabian ; Gierlings, Matthias ; Noss, Dominik ; Schimmler, Sascha ; Klemm, Alexander ; Grundmann, Leif ; Frosch, Tilman ; Schinzel, Sebastian
Medizinische Einrichtungen waren in den letzten Jahren immer wieder von Cyber-Angriffen betroffen. Auch wenn sich diese Angriffe derzeit auf die Office-IT-Infrastruktur der Einrichtungen konzentrieren, existiert mit medizinischen Systemen und Kommunikationsprotokollen eine weitere wenig beachtete Angriffsoberfläche. In diesem Beitrag analysieren wir die weit verbreiteten medizintechnischen Kommunikations-Protokolle DICOM und HL7 sowie Protokoll-Implementierungen auf ihre IT-Sicherheit. Dafür präsentieren wir die Ergebnisse der Sicherheitsanalyse der DICOM- und HL7-Standards, einen Fuzzer “MedFUZZ” für diese Protokolle sowie einen Schwachstellenscanner “MedVAS”, der Schwachstellen in medizintechnischen Produktivumgebungen auffinden kann.
Behavioral responses to a cyber attack in a hospital environment (2021)
Willing, Markus ; Dresen, Christian ; Gerlitz, Eva ; Haering, Maximilian ; Smith, Matthew ; Binnewies, Carmen ; Guess, Tim ; Haverkamp, Uwe ; Schinzel, Sebastian
Technical and organizational steps are necessary to mitigate cyber threats and reduce risks. Human behavior is the last line of defense for many hospitals and is considered as equally important as technical security. Medical staff must be properly trained to perform such procedures. This paper presents the first qualitative, interdisciplinary research on how members of an intermediate care unit react to a cyberattack against their patient monitoring equipment. We conducted a simulation in a hospital training environment with 20 intensive care nurses. By the end of the experiment, 12 of the 20 participants realized the monitors’ incorrect behavior. We present a qualitative behavior analysis of high performing participants (HPP) and low performing participants (LPP). The HPP showed fewer signs of stress, were easier on their colleagues, and used analog systems more often than the LPP. With 40% of our participants not recognizing the attack, we see room for improvements through the use of proper tools and provision of adequate training to prepare staff for potential attacks in the future.
Experiences with General Data Protection Regulations and Remote Monitoring of Implantable Rhythm Devices (2021)
Willing, Markus ; Saatjohann, Christoph ; Rath, Benjamin ; Schinzel, Sebastian ; Eckardt, Lars ; Köbe, Julia
Grand Theft App: Digital Forensics of Vehicle Assistant Apps (2021)
Ebbers, Simon ; Ising, Fabian ; Saatjohann, Christoph ; Schinzel, Sebastian
Due to the increasing connectivity of modern vehicles, collected data is no longer only stored in the vehicle itself but also transmitted to car manufacturers and vehicle assistant apps. This development opens up new possibilities for digital forensics in criminal investigations involving modern vehicles. This paper deals with the digital forensic analysis of vehicle assistant apps of eight car manufacturers. We reconstruct the driver’s activities based on the data stored on the smartphones and in the manufacturer’s backend. For this purpose, data of the Android and iOS apps of the car manufacturers Audi, BMW, Ford, Mercedes, Opel, Seat, Tesla, and Volkswagen were extracted from the smartphone and examined using digital forensic methods following forensics guidelines. Additionally, manufacturer data was retrieved using Subject Access Requests. Using the extensive data gathered, we reconstruct trips and refueling processes, determine parking positions and duration, and track the locking and unlocking of the vehicle. Our findings show that the digital forensic investigation of smartphone applications is a useful addition to vehicle forensics and should therefore be taken into account in the strategic preparation of future digital forensic investigations.
Listen to Your Heart: Evaluation of the Cardiologic Ecosystem (2021)
Puschner, Endres ; Saatjohann, Christoph ; Willing, Markus ; Dresen, Christian ; Köbe, Julia ; Rath, Benjamin ; Paar, Christof ; Eckardt, Lars ; Haverkamp, Uwe ; Schinzel, Sebastian
Modern implantable cardiologic devices communicate via radio frequency techniques and nearby gateways to a backend server on the internet. Those implanted devices, gateways, and servers form an ecosystem of proprietary hardware and protocols that process sensitive medical data and is often vital for patients’ health. This paper analyzes the security of this Ecosystem, from technical gateway aspects, via the programmer, to configure the implanted device, up to the processing of personal medical data from large cardiological device producers. Based on a real-world attacker model, we evaluated different devices and found several severe vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we could purchase a fully functional programmer for implantable cardiological devices, allowing us to re-program such devices or even induce electric shocks on untampered implanted devices. Additionally, we sent several Art. 15 and Art. 20 GDPR inquiries to manufacturers of implantable cardiologic devices, revealing non-conforming processes and a lack of awareness about patients’ rights and companies’ obligations. This, and the fact that many vulnerabilities are still to be found after many vulnerability disclosures in recent years, present a worrying security state of the whole ecosystem.
ALPACA: Application Layer Protocol Confusion - Analyzing and Mitigating Cracks in TLS Authentication (2021)
Brinkmann, Marcus ; Dresen, Christian ; Merget, Robert ; Poddebniak, Damian ; Müller, Jens ; Somorovsky, Juraj ; Schwenk, Jörg ; Schinzel, Sebastian
Why TLS is better without STARTTLS: A Security Analysis of STARTTLS in the Email Context (2021)
Poddebniak, Damian ; Ising, Fabian ; Böck, Hanno ; Schinzel, Sebastian
TLS is one of today's most widely used and best-analyzed encryption technologies. However, for historical reasons, TLS for email protocols is often not used directly but negotiated via STARTTLS. This additional negotiation adds complexity and was prone to security vulnerabilities such as naive STARTTLS stripping or command injection attacks in the past. We perform the first structured analysis of STARTTLS in SMTP, POP3, and IMAP and introduce EAST, a semi-automatic testing toolkit with more than 100 test cases covering a wide range of variants of STARTTLS stripping, command and response injections, tampering attacks, and UI spoofing attacks for email protocols. Our analysis focuses on the confidentiality and integrity of email submission (email client to SMTP server) and email retrieval (email client to POP3 or IMAP server). While some of our findings are also relevant for email transport (from one SMTP server to another), the security implications in email submission and retrieval are more critical because these connections involve not only individual email messages but also user credentials that allow access to a user's email archive. We used EAST to analyze 28 email clients and 23 servers. In total, we reported over 40 STARTTLS issues, some of which allow mailbox spoofing, credential stealing, and even the hosting of HTTPS with a cross-protocol attack on IMAP. We conducted an Internet-wide scan for the particularly dangerous command injection attack and found that 320.000 email servers (2% of all email servers) are affected. Surprisingly, several clients were vulnerable to STARTTLS stripping attacks. In total, only 3 out of 28 clients did not show any STARTTLS-specific security issues. Even though the command injection attack received multiple CVEs in the past, EAST detected eight new instances of this problem. In total, only 7 out of 23 tested servers were never affected by this issue. We conclude that STARTTLS is error-prone to implement, under-specified in the standards, and should be avoided.
Analyzing medical device connectivity and its effect on cyber security in german hospitals (2020)
Willing, Markus ; Dresen, Christian ; Haverkamp, Uwe ; Schinzel, Sebastian
Background: Modern healthcare devices can be connected to computer networks and many western healthcareinstitutions run those devices in networks. At the same time, cyber attacks are on the rise and there is evidence thatcybercriminals do not spare critical infrastructure such as major hospitals, even if they endanger patients. Intuitively,the more and closer connected healthcare devices are to public networks, the higher the risk of getting attacked. Methods: To asses the current connectivity status of healthcare devices, we surveyed the field of German hospitalsand especially University Medical Center UMCs. Results: The results show a strong correlation between the networking degree and the number of medical devices.The average number of medical devices is 25.150, with a median of networked medical devices of 3.600. Actual keyusers of networked medical devices are the departments Radiology, Intensive Care, Radio-Oncology RO, NuclearMedicine NUC, and Anaesthesiology in the group of UMCs. In the next five years, the usage of networked medicaldevices will increase significantly in the departments of Surgery, Intensive Care, and Radiology. We detected a strongcorrelation between the degree of connectivity and the likelihood of being attacked.The survey answers regarding the cyber security status reveal a lack of security basics in some of the inquiredhospitals. We did discover successful attacks in hospitals with separated or subsidiary departments. A fusion ofcompetencies on an organizational level facilitates the right behavior here. Most hospitals rated themselvespredominantly positively in the self-assessment but also stated the usefulness of IT security insurance.Conclusions:Concluding our results, hospitals are already facing the consequences of omitted measures within theirgrowing pool of medical devices. Continuously relying on historically grown structures without adaption and trustingmanufactures to solve vectors is a critical behavior that could seriously endanger patients.
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