TY - CHAP A1 - Willing, Markus A1 - Saatjohann, Christoph A1 - Rath, Benjamin A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian A1 - Eckardt, Lars A1 - Köbe, Julia T1 - Experiences with General Data Protection Regulations and Remote Monitoring of Implantable Rhythm Devices T2 - 87. Jahrestagung der Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kardiologie – Herz‑ und Kreislauforschung e.V Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00392-021-01843-w PB - Springer-Verlag GmbH ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Willing, Markus A1 - Dresen, Christian A1 - Haverkamp, Uwe A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian T1 - Analyzing medical device connectivity and its effect on cyber security in german hospitals N2 - Background: Modern healthcare devices can be connected to computer networks and many western healthcareinstitutions run those devices in networks. At the same time, cyber attacks are on the rise and there is evidence thatcybercriminals do not spare critical infrastructure such as major hospitals, even if they endanger patients. Intuitively,the more and closer connected healthcare devices are to public networks, the higher the risk of getting attacked. Methods: To asses the current connectivity status of healthcare devices, we surveyed the field of German hospitalsand especially University Medical Center UMCs. Results: The results show a strong correlation between the networking degree and the number of medical devices.The average number of medical devices is 25.150, with a median of networked medical devices of 3.600. Actual keyusers of networked medical devices are the departments Radiology, Intensive Care, Radio-Oncology RO, NuclearMedicine NUC, and Anaesthesiology in the group of UMCs. In the next five years, the usage of networked medicaldevices will increase significantly in the departments of Surgery, Intensive Care, and Radiology. We detected a strongcorrelation between the degree of connectivity and the likelihood of being attacked.The survey answers regarding the cyber security status reveal a lack of security basics in some of the inquiredhospitals. We did discover successful attacks in hospitals with separated or subsidiary departments. A fusion ofcompetencies on an organizational level facilitates the right behavior here. Most hospitals rated themselvespredominantly positively in the self-assessment but also stated the usefulness of IT security insurance.Conclusions:Concluding our results, hospitals are already facing the consequences of omitted measures within theirgrowing pool of medical devices. Continuously relying on historically grown structures without adaption and trustingmanufactures to solve vectors is a critical behavior that could seriously endanger patients. Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12911-020-01259-y PB - BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making volume ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Willing, Markus A1 - Dresen, Christian A1 - Gerlitz, Eva A1 - Haering, Maximilian A1 - Smith, Matthew A1 - Binnewies, Carmen A1 - Guess, Tim A1 - Haverkamp, Uwe A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian T1 - Behavioral responses to a cyber attack in a hospital environment JF - Nature -- Scientific Reports N2 - Technical and organizational steps are necessary to mitigate cyber threats and reduce risks. Human behavior is the last line of defense for many hospitals and is considered as equally important as technical security. Medical staff must be properly trained to perform such procedures. This paper presents the first qualitative, interdisciplinary research on how members of an intermediate care unit react to a cyberattack against their patient monitoring equipment. We conducted a simulation in a hospital training environment with 20 intensive care nurses. By the end of the experiment, 12 of the 20 participants realized the monitors’ incorrect behavior. We present a qualitative behavior analysis of high performing participants (HPP) and low performing participants (LPP). The HPP showed fewer signs of stress, were easier on their colleagues, and used analog systems more often than the LPP. With 40% of our participants not recognizing the attack, we see room for improvements through the use of proper tools and provision of adequate training to prepare staff for potential attacks in the future. Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-98576-7 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Wiegenstein, Andreas A1 - Schumacher, Markus A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian A1 - Weidemann, Frederik T1 - Sichere ABAP-Programmierung T2 - Rheinwerk Verlag GmbH Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-3-8362-1357-8 SP - 1 EP - 372 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schumilo, Sergej A1 - Aschermann, Cornelius A1 - Gawlik, Robert A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian A1 - Holz, Thorsten T1 - kAFL: Hardware-Assisted Feedback Fuzzing for OS Kernels T2 - 26th Usenix Security Symposium Y1 - 2017 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schmitt, Isabell A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian T1 - WAFFle: Fingerprinting Filter Rules of Web Application Firewalls T2 - 6th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 2012) Y1 - 2012 SP - 34 EP - 40 CY - Seattle. ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian A1 - Weidemann, Frederik A1 - Wiegenstein, Andreas A1 - Schumacher, Markus T1 - SAP-Security - Sicherheitslöcher in eigenem ABAP-Code stopfen JF - iX - Magazin für professionelle Informationstechnik Y1 - 2011 IS - 07 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian A1 - Thünemann, Maximilian A1 - Löhr, Dennis T1 - Internetzensus - Das Internet scannen und auf Schwachstellen untersuchen JF - iX - Security kompakt Y1 - 2014 SN - 4018837005 IS - 4 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian A1 - Schmucker, Martin A1 - Ebinger, Peter T1 - Security mechanisms of a legal peer-to-peer file sharing system (http://www.iadis.net/dl/Search_list_open.asp?code=6365) T2 - IADIS International Journal on Computer Science and Information Systems Y1 - 2009 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schinzel, Sebastian A1 - Schmitt, Isabell T1 - Über Umwege - Seitenkanalangriffe auf Netzwerkanwendungen JF - iX - Magazin für professionelle Informationstechnik Y1 - 2012 IS - 11 ER -