@incollection{AviramSchinzelSomorovskyetal.2016,
  author    = {Aviram, Nimrod and Schinzel, Sebastian and Somorovsky, Juraj and Heninger, Nadia and Dankel, Maik and Steube, Jens and Valenta, Luke and Adrian, David and Halderman, J. Alex and Dukhovni, Viktor and K{\"a}sper, Emilia and Cohney, Shaanan and Engels, Susanne and Paar, Christof and Shavitt, Yuval},
  title     = {DROWN: Breaking TLS Using SSLv2},
  series = {25th Usenix Security Symposium},
  booktitle = {25th Usenix Security Symposium},
  publisher = {Usenix Association.},
  address   = {Austin, TX.},
  pages     = {689 -- 706},
  year      = {2016},
  language  = {mul}
}
@inproceedings{PuschnerSaatjohannWillingetal.2021,
  author    = {Puschner, Endres and Saatjohann, Christoph and Willing, Markus and Dresen, Christian and K{\"o}be, Julia and Rath, Benjamin and Paar, Christof and Eckardt, Lars and Haverkamp, Uwe and Schinzel, Sebastian},
  title     = {Listen to Your Heart: Evaluation of the Cardiologic Ecosystem},
  series = {ARES 2021: The 16th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security},
  booktitle = {ARES 2021: The 16th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security},
  doi       = {10.1145/3465481.3465753},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:836-opus-139012},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Modern implantable cardiologic devices communicate via radio frequency techniques and nearby gateways to a backend server on the internet. Those implanted devices, gateways, and servers form an ecosystem of proprietary hardware and protocols that process sensitive medical data and is often vital for patients' health. This paper analyzes the security of this Ecosystem, from technical gateway aspects, via the programmer, to configure the implanted device, up to the processing of personal medical data from large cardiological device producers. Based on a real-world attacker model, we evaluated different devices and found several severe vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we could purchase a fully functional programmer for implantable cardiological devices, allowing us to re-program such devices or even induce electric shocks on untampered implanted devices. Additionally, we sent several Art. 15 and Art. 20 GDPR inquiries to manufacturers of implantable cardiologic devices, revealing non-conforming processes and a lack of awareness about patients' rights and companies' obligations. This, and the fact that many vulnerabilities are still to be found after many vulnerability disclosures in recent years, present a worrying security state of the whole ecosystem.},
  language  = {en}
}