@article{GierlingSaatjohannDresenetal.2020,
  author    = {Gierling, Markus and Saatjohann, Christoph and Dresen, Christian and K{\"o}be, Julia and Rath, Benjamin and Eckardt, Lars and Schinzel, Sebastian},
  title     = {Reviewing Cyber Security Research of Implantable Medical Rhythm Devices regarding Patients' Risk},
  series = {86. Jahrestagung und Herztage 2020 der DGK},
  volume    = {Band 109, Supplement 1, April 2020},
  journal   = {86. Jahrestagung und Herztage 2020 der DGK},
  doi       = {10.1007/s00392-020-01621-0},
  pages     = {1 -- 2},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Introduction: The recent publication of several critical cyber security issues in cardiac implantable devices and the resulting press coverage upsets affected users and their trust in medical device producers. Reviewing the published security vulnerabilities regarding networked medical devices, it raises the question, if the reporting media, the responsible security researchers, and the producers handle security vulnerabilities appropriately. Are the media reports of security vulnerabilities in medical devices meaningful in a way that patients can assess their respective risk for an attack via the security vulnerability? The collaboration between IT-security experts and clinicians aims at reviewing published security vulnerabilities of rhythm devices, and evaluate overall patients risks. Methodology: We performed a literature review on security vulnerabilities in implantable medical devices with a focus on cardiac devices. We analyzed (Fig. 1) the (1) requirements for an attacker and the (2) technical feasibility and clustered them in three different scenarios: The first scenario requires that the attacker physically approaches a victim with a programming device. The second scenario requires proximity to the victim, e.g., within a few meters. The third and strongest attacker scenario is a remote attack that doesn't require any physical proximity to the victim. We then compare the attacker scenarios and (3) the overall patients' risks with the press coverage (overhyped, adequate, underhyped). (4) The resulting overall patients' risk was rated by clinicians (security vulnerability of patients' data, dangerous programming possible). Results: Out of the three analyzed incidents, we found one to be underhyped, one to be overhyped, and one was appropriate compared to the medial coverage (Fig. 2). The most occurring technical issues were based on the absence of basic security primitives. The patient damage for all of the analyzed incidents was fatal in the worst-case scenario. Further, the patient damage and the overall patient risks are disjunct due to the missing capability of performing large scale attacks. Conclusion: The resulting overall patients' risks may not adequately reflect the patient damage in the considered cases. Often, the overall patient risk is not as severe as the necessary attacker capabilities are high and it would require strongly motivated attackers to perform the attack. Therefore, most of the reviewed cases are considered with a smaller overall patient risk than implied by press reports. Reviewing the ongoing IT-Security trends regarding implantable medical devices shows an increasing focus on researching in the field of medical device security. Therefore, further findings in the near future are to be expected. To deal with this fact in a responsible way, proper proactive knowledge management is mandatory. We recommend medical staff to critically reflect reports in mass media due to possible sensationalism. Therefore, we propose a joint approach in combining the technical expertise of cyber security experts with clinical aspects of medical experts, to ensure a solid understanding of a newly published vulnerability. The combination of both communities promises to result in better predictions for patients' risks from security vulnerabilities in implanted cardiac devices.},
  language  = {en}
}
@inproceedings{GierlingDresenEichetal.2018,
  author    = {Gierling, Markus and Dresen, Christian and Eich, Hans and Mittman, Karin and Schinzel, Sebastian and Haverkamp, Uwe},
  title     = {Analysis and consequences of an imaging process concerning the cyber security of a networked computer tomography scanner},
  series = {STRAHLENTHERAPIE UND ONKOLOGIE},
  booktitle = {STRAHLENTHERAPIE UND ONKOLOGIE},
  pages     = {185 -- 186},
  year      = {2018},
  language  = {en}
}
@inproceedings{MuellerBrinkmannPoddebniaketal.2020,
  author    = {M{\"u}ller, Jens and Brinkmann, Marcus and Poddebniak, Damian and Schinzel, Sebastian and Schwenk, J{\"o}rg},
  title     = {Mailto: Me Your Secrets. On Bugs and Features in Email End-to-End Encryption},
  series = {2020 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)},
  booktitle = {2020 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)},
  doi       = {10.1109/CNS48642.2020.9162218},
  pages     = {1 -- 9},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {OpenPGP and S/MIME are the two major standards for email end-to-end encryption. We show practical attacks against both encryption schemes in the context of email. First, we present a design flaw in the key update mechanism, allowing a third party to deploy a new key to the communication partners. Second, we show how email clients can be tricked into acting as an oracle for decryption or signing by exploiting their functionality to auto-save drafts. Third, we demonstrate how to exfiltrate the private key, based on proprietary mailto parameters implemented by various email clients. An evaluation shows that 8 out of 20 tested email clients are vulnerable to at least one attack. While our attacks do not target the underlying cryptographic primitives, they raise concerns about the practical security of OpenPGP and S/MIME email applications. Finally, we propose countermeasures and discuss their advantages and disadvantages.},
  language  = {de}
}
@inproceedings{MuellerIsingMla­de­novetal.2020,
  author    = {M{\"u}ller, Jens and Ising, Fabian and Mla­de­nov, Vla­dis­lav and Mainka, Chris­ti­an and Schinzel, Sebastian and Schwenk, J{\"o}rg},
  title     = {Of­fice Do­cu­ment Se­cu­ri­ty and Pri­va­cy},
  series = {14th USE­NIX Work­shop on Of­fen­si­ve Tech­no­lo­gies (WOOT 2020)},
  booktitle = {14th USE­NIX Work­shop on Of­fen­si­ve Tech­no­lo­gies (WOOT 2020)},
  publisher = {USENIX},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {OOXML and ODF are the de facto standard data formats for word processing, spreadsheets, and presentations. Both are XML-based, feature-rich container formats dating back to the early 2000s. In this work, we present a systematic analysis of the capabilities of malicious office documents. Instead of focusing on implementation bugs, we abuse legitimate features of the OOXML and ODF specifications. We categorize our attacks into five classes: (1) Denial-of-Service attacks affecting the host on which the document is processed. (2) Invasion of privacy attacks that track the usage of the document. (3) Information disclosure attacks exfiltrating personal data out of the victim's computer. (4) Data manipulation on the victim's system. (5) Code execution on the victim's machine. We evaluated the reference implementations - Microsoft Office and LibreOffice - and found both of them to be vulnerable to each tested class of attacks. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies to counter these attacks.},
  language  = {en}
}