@inproceedings{DresenIsingPoddebniaketal.2020,
  author    = {Dresen, Christian and Ising, Fabian and Poddebniak, Damian and Kappert, Tobias and Holz, Thorsten and Schinzel, Sebastian},
  title     = {CORSICA: Cross-Origin Web Service Identification},
  series = {The 15th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  booktitle = {The 15th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  editor    = {Zhou, Jianying},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Vulnerabilities in private networks are difficult to detect for attackers outside of the network. While there are known methods for port scanning internal hosts that work by luring unwitting internal users to an external web page that hosts malicious JavaScript code, no such method for detailed and precise service identification is known. The reason is that the Same Origin Policy (SOP) prevents access to HTTP responses of other origins by default. We perform a structured analysis of loopholes in the SOP that can be used to identify web applications across network boundaries. For this, we analyze HTML5, CSS, and JavaScript features of standard-compliant web browsers that may leak sensitive information about cross-origin content. The results reveal several novel techniques, including leaking JavaScript function names or styles of cross-origin requests that are available in all common browsers. We implement and test these techniques in a tool called CORSICA. It can successfully identify 31 of 42 (74\%) of web services running on different IoT devices as well as the version numbers of the four most widely used content management systems WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, and TYPO3. CORSICA can also determine the patch level on average down to three versions (WordPress), six versions (Drupal), two versions (Joomla), and four versions (TYPO3) with only ten requests on average. Furthermore, CORSICA is able to identify 48 WordPress plugins containing 65 vulnerabilities. Finally, we analyze mitigation strategies and show that the proposed but not yet implemented strategies Cross-Origin Resource Policy (CORP)} and Sec-Metadata would prevent our identification techniques.},
  language  = {en}
}
@inproceedings{SaatjohannIsingKringsetal.2020,
  author    = {Saatjohann, Christoph and Ising, Fabian and Krings, Luise and Schinzel, Sebastian},
  title     = {STALK: security analysis of smartwatches for kids},
  series = {ARES 2020: The 15th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security / Editors: Melanie Volkamer, Christian Wressnegger},
  booktitle = {ARES 2020: The 15th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security / Editors: Melanie Volkamer, Christian Wressnegger},
  isbn      = {978-1-4503-8833-7},
  doi       = {10.1145/3407023.3407037},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:836-opus-123548},
  pages     = {1 -- 10},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Smart wearable devices become more and more prevalent in the age of the Internet of Things. While people wear them as fitness trackers or full-fledged smartphones, they also come in unique versions as smartwatches for children. These watches allow parents to track the location of their children in real-time and offer a communication channel between parent and child. In this paper, we analyzed six smartwatches for children and the corresponding backend platforms and applications for security and privacy concerns. We structure our analysis in distinct attacker scenarios and collect and describe related literature outside academic publications. Using a cellular network Man-in-the-Middle setup, reverse engineering, and dynamic analysis, we found several severe security issues, allowing for sensitive data disclosure, complete watch takeover, and illegal remote monitoring functionality.},
  language  = {en}
}
@inproceedings{MuellerIsingMla­de­novetal.2020,
  author    = {M{\"u}ller, Jens and Ising, Fabian and Mla­de­nov, Vla­dis­lav and Mainka, Chris­ti­an and Schinzel, Sebastian and Schwenk, J{\"o}rg},
  title     = {Of­fice Do­cu­ment Se­cu­ri­ty and Pri­va­cy},
  series = {14th USE­NIX Work­shop on Of­fen­si­ve Tech­no­lo­gies (WOOT 2020)},
  booktitle = {14th USE­NIX Work­shop on Of­fen­si­ve Tech­no­lo­gies (WOOT 2020)},
  publisher = {USENIX},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {OOXML and ODF are the de facto standard data formats for word processing, spreadsheets, and presentations. Both are XML-based, feature-rich container formats dating back to the early 2000s. In this work, we present a systematic analysis of the capabilities of malicious office documents. Instead of focusing on implementation bugs, we abuse legitimate features of the OOXML and ODF specifications. We categorize our attacks into five classes: (1) Denial-of-Service attacks affecting the host on which the document is processed. (2) Invasion of privacy attacks that track the usage of the document. (3) Information disclosure attacks exfiltrating personal data out of the victim's computer. (4) Data manipulation on the victim's system. (5) Code execution on the victim's machine. We evaluated the reference implementations - Microsoft Office and LibreOffice - and found both of them to be vulnerable to each tested class of attacks. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies to counter these attacks.},
  language  = {en}
}